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Notes
UNMERITED CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME
COURT
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Doras He-
bert et al v. Louisiana,' in which the Court affirmed a decision of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana and held that an act which violates the
liquor laws of a state and of the nation is an offense against both sov-
ereignties and may be punished by both, has called forth some vigorous
criticism of that tribunal. Thus a great eastern daily says:
' Decided Oct. 13, 1926. Sup. Ct. Reporter Adv. sheet No. 3, p. 103.
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It is inconceivable that a Supreme Court-any Supreme Court
-- should have made such a decision only a few years back. But
since Volsteadism became the law of the land many things have
changed. The Anti-Saloon League and the other forces backing
this most asinine of laws have succeeded in changing the dignity
and standing of the judiciary. With this spirit in the courts, it is
not surprising that legal doctrines which had no place in justice or
in common sense should be enunciated and supported.
2
Not to be outdone a mid-western daily says editorially that "the un-
holy precedent of the Supreme Court will have its evil spawn," for
There are other concurrent Federal and State laws, each one
subject to the same interpretation, each one certain to drag its un-
happy victims back and forth across the street-from one court
to another. Thus Prohibition destroys, not only the written, but
the unwritten law of the land.
The Constitution expressly forbids double jeopardy, but in the
opinion of the Supreme Court this safeguard is meaningless where
one violates both a Federal law and a law of a State. That is, how-
ever much it may be against the spirit of the Constitution or even
the traditional custom of courts, which usually have not practiced
double jeopardy, this sinister departure from American fairness
becomes a terrible reality when the chief tribunal of the land is
forced to construe the meaning of concurrent jurisdiction.
It was this intolerable condition that the makers of the Consti-
tution had in mind when double jeopardy was forbidden. They knew
very well that the zealot would never get done persecuting those
who opposed him. Yet the United States Supreme Court, finding
itself unable to set aside either the sovereignty of the Federal Gov-
ernment or that of the State, sets the Constitution aside at one
point to sustain it at another.3
It is not the purpose of the present writer to express any opinion on
the policy involved in the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead law
or on the methods by which they are sought to be enforced, but he does
desire to enter a respectful protest against such intemperate criticism
of the Supreme Court.
That the criticisms quoted are unmerited and that they come nearly
a hundred years too late will appear from a very brief review of the
prior decisions of the Supreme Court. It will be recalled that the pro-
hibition against double jeopardy is found in the Fifth Amendment. 4
In one of the last great constitutional opinions written by Chief Justice
Marshall, he demonstrated beyond a doubt that this and the other pro-
visions of the first ten amendments were intended as restrictions on the
powers of the National Government and not on those of the states.
Said he:
'Baltimore Sun, as quoted in the Literary Digest, Nov. 20, p. 18.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch as quoted in Literary Digest, Op. Cit.
. . . "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life and limb."
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Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required
changes in their constitutions; had they desired additional safe-
guards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their
particular governments; the remedy was in their own hands, and
would have been applied by themselves . . . . Had Congress en-
gaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitu-
tions of the several states by affording the people additional pro-
tection from the exercise of power by their own governments in
matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have de-
clared this purpose in plain and intelligible language . . . . Se-
rious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which
the patriot statesman, who then watched over the interests of our
country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainments of those
invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exer-
cised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every conven-
tion by which the Constitution was adopted, amendments to guard
against abuse of power were recommended. These amendments
demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the
general government, not against those of the local governments.
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed to quiet
fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by
the required majority in Congress, and adopted by the States.
These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention
to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so ap-
ply them.5
From this decision of the great Chief Justice, which has never been
questioned to this day, it is clear that the double jeopardy provision of
the Federal Constitution only protects the citizen against being twice
prosecuted in the Federal courts for one offense. The right thus se-
cured to the citizen has been jealously guarded by the Court. Thus,
where an American soldier in the Philippine Islands had been tried
and acquitted of homicide in a United States military court and was
later tried and convicted in the civil courts maintained by the United
States in the Islands, the Supreme Court held that since both courts
were established and maintained under the authority of the United
States the second prosecution constituted double jeopardy, and so it re-
versed the judgment and ordered the prosecution dismissed.0 But this
had nothing to do with the case where the same act violates the laws of
two sovereignties, as in the case from Louisiana just decided. In such
cases the Supreme Court, beginning with the case of Fox v. Ohio,7 de-
cided in 1847, has uniformly held that there are two distinct offenses
and each sovereignty has a right to vindicate its own laws. In that case,
the offense involved was that of passing counterfeit coin, an act that the
court held both state and nation had a right to forbid and punish. Three
years later a similar result was reached on a similar state of facts, the
court saying:
'Barron v. Baltimore (1833), 7 Peters 243.
'Grafton v. United States (1907), 206 U. S. 333. 5 How. 410, 434.
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With the view of avoiding conflicts between the State and the
Federal jurisdictions, this court in the case of Fox v. The State
of Ohio have taken care to point out that the act might, as to its
character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, consti-
tute an offense against both the State and the Federal governments,
and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by
either, as appropriate to its character in reference to each. W¥e
think this distinction sound . . ..
Another case arose two years later involving the right of the State
of Illinois to punish one of its citizens for "harboring and secreting a
negro slave." The Supreme Court of the state and the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the Illinois statute in spite of the fact that
the defendant might be punished a second time for the same act,
under the Federal fugitive slave law. Speaking for the latter court,
Justice Grier said:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state
or a territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sover-
eigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws
of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of
the laws of both. Thus an assault upon the marshal of the United
States, and a hindering him in the execution of legal process, is
a high offense against the United States, for which the perpetrator
is liable for punishment; and the same act may be also a gross
breach of the peace of the state, a riot, assault, or a murder, and
subject the same person to a punishment, under the state laws, for
a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may (if they see fit)
punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same
offense; but only that by one act he has committed two offenses,
for each of which he is justly punishable.9
The doctrine thus vigorously and repeatedly announced nearly a cen-
tury ago was first applied to a liquor case in 1922, when the Supreme
Court in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Taft held that one Lanza,
who had already been punished for the violation of the prohibition laws
of the State of Washington, could be again punished in the Federal
Courts for the violation of Volstead law, growing out of the same acts
of manufacture and transportation of intoxicating liquors. In his
opinion the Chief Justice quotes the following language from an earlier
case :10
In support of this position numerous cases are cited which like
Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, hold that the same act may
constitute a criminal offense against two sovereignties, and that
'United States v. Marigold (1850), 9 How. 560, 569.
'Moore v. Illinois (1852), 14 How. 13, 14 L. Ed. 306.
' Southern Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Indiana, 236 U. S. 439, 445.
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punishment by one does not prevent punishment by the other. That
doctrine is throughly established. But, upon an analysis of the
principle on which it is founded, it will be found to relate only to
cases where the act sought to be punished is one over which both
sovereignties have jurisdiction. This concurrent jurisdiction may
be either because the nature of the act is such that at the same time
it produces effects respectively within the sphere of state and fed-
eral regulation and thus violates the laws of both; or, where there
is this double effect in a matter of which one can exercise control
but an authoritative declaration that the paramount jurisdiction
of one shall not exclude that of the other."
In view of this long and unbroken line of decisions it is surprising to
find great newspapers saying that "it is inconceivable that the Supreme
Court-any supreme court-should have made such a decision only a
few years back," and that the court has been so influenced by the rabid
reformers that it "sets the Constitution aside at one point to sustain
it at another." It can hardly be said that this "unholy precedent" is
the result of recent innovations that have "succeeded in changing the
dignity and standing of the judiciary." Such criticisms can only tend
to weaken the confidence of the people in this great tribunal which has
to a remarkable degree kept itself free from the partisan bitterness
and political turmoil that have marked many periods of our history as
a nation.
That there is a question of policy involved in such double prosecu-
tions is not to be denied. The court itself has recognized that fact,
and in the case of Fox v. Ohio the court said:
It is almost certain that, in the benignant spirit in which the
institutions both of the state and federal systems are administered,
an offender who should have suffered the penalties denounced by
the one would not be subjected a second time to punishment by
the other for acts essentially the same, unless indeed this might oc-
cur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety
demanded extraordinary rigor. But were a contrary course of
policy and action either probable or usual, this would by no meansjustify the conclusion, that offenses falling within the competency
of different authorities to restrain or punish them would not prop-
erly be subjected to the consequences which those authorities might
ordain and affix to their perpetration.12
With this question of policy the court involved in the recent case from
Louisiana, had nothing to do. It was only called on to say whether
the power existed. If the policy of double punishment is bad Congress
and the state legislatures have it within their power to restrain their
administrative officials from instituting a second prosecution where
the offender has already suffered the penalty prescribed in another juris-
diction. Thus Chief Justice Taft in the Lanza case said:
=' United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 384.
'5 How. 435.
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If Congress sees fit to bar prosecution by the federal courts
for any act when punishment for violation of state prohibition
has been imposed, it can, of course, do so by proper legislative pro-
vision; but it has not done so. If a State were to punish the manu-
facture, transportation and sale of intoxicating liquor by small or
nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts of that State to
plead guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution for such
acts would not make for respect for the federal statute or for its
deterrent effect. But it is not for us to discuss the wisdom of
legislation, it is enough for us to hold that, in the absence of spe-
cial provisions by Congress, conviction and punishment in a state
court under a state law for making, transporting and selling intox-
icating liquors is not a bar to a prosecution in a court of the United
States under the federal law for the same acts.' 3
The fact that cases of prosecution by both state and federal author-
ities for the same act are so rare, among the thousands of cases in which
this is possible, shows that in practice our federal and state prosecu-
ting officers recognize the policy involved and as a matter of comity in
the great majority of cases refrain from prosecuting where the defend-
ant has been punished in another jurisdiction.
C. S. POTTS.
THE EXCEPTIONS AS TO WORKS OF NECESSITY AND
CHARITY IN SUNDAY LABOR LAWS
From the accounts in the newspapers on the following day through-
out the country, there was a strict enforcement of the Sunday labor law
in Irvington, N. J. on Sunday, December 12, 1926. Many of the news-
papers and their readers regarded this action as a remnant of the old
"Blue Laws" and not of much importance as they no doubt thought
that Sunday labor laws are in existence in only a few states and cities,
and that they, especially in the Western states, of course had no such
laws. As a matter of fact, statutes prohibiting labor of one sort or
another exist in every state and territory in the Union, but not in the
District of Columbia and the Philippine Islands.' While it is true
that in a few states not all labor on Sunday is prohibited, almost all the
states have statutes prohibiting all labor on Sunday, except acts of ne-
cessity and charity. Although Sunday labor statutes may not always
be enforced as penal statutes, their existence is important in other mat-
ters, such as defeating actions on torts and contracts.
Much space has been devoted in the digests and legal periodicals to
the subject of Sunday laws in its various phases, and even books have
u260 U. S. 385.
'U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS BULLETIN No. 370 (May 1925). See p.
66, where citations are given to the various state statutes. Bill is now pending
in Congress for Sunday rest law in District of Columbia (H.R. 10311).
It appears that Sunday laws have been repealed in California, and the law
providing for one day's rest in seven substituted for them. General Laws of
Calif. (1923), Act. 4718.
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